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Distributed ledger technology such as blockchain could ideally be used to solve 
challenges in global supply chain assurance. In blockchain, consensus is achieved among 
active concurrent participants. The chain is, by design, required to be a single forward-
building path of events; if branches appear, the chain consensus ensures that all but one 
branch is discarded. A supply chain in comparison, particularly on the production side, is 
a reversed architecture. In this case, small parts are used to build larger parts, hence 
requiring blockchain mergence (e.g., a final ready-for-use vehicle is comprised of 
multiple smaller parts sourced from various vendors, manufacturers, and even countries). 
Thus, the current capabilities of blockchain do not meet the fundamental demands of 
supply chains. Assuring supply chain integrity and visibility requires an adaptation of the 
technology to allow a form of blockchain mergence that the original concept was not 
designed to handle. This research looks at a possible solution among hash chains, 
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I. BACKGROUND 
Blockchain has been widely researched for applications due to the technology’s 
ability to support consensus among distributed participants. The chain is, by design, 
required to be a single, forward path of events; if branches appear, the chain consensus 
ensures that all but one branch is discarded (Zheng et al., 2017). A supply chain, in 
comparison, particularly on the production side, is a reversed architecture. In this case, 
small parts are used to build larger parts, hence requiring a form of mergence (e.g., a final 
ready-for-use vehicle is comprised of multiple smaller parts sourced from various 
vendors, manufacturers, and even countries). Blockchain, according to its current design, 
fundamentally disallows this. Assuring supply chain integrity and visibility requires an 
adaptation of the technology to allow a form of blockchain mergence that the original 
concept was not designed to handle. 
 
A. APPROACH 
To survey existing blockchain solutions for forms of mergence, i.e., solutions for 
merging chains into a single blockchain, such as would be necessary for supply chain 
assurance. 
To analyze potential solutions using partner signatures (where supply chain 
partners commit to chain addenda by digitally signing new blocks while also committing 
to the entire previous chain). This requires analysis of security considerations based on 
different commitment variants. Furthermore, it requires consideration of potential 
timelines and timeline collisions of block production. 
The above solutions are evaluated with respect to formal blockchain integration. 
In particular, the research investigates whether or not mergence of distributed ledgers is 
possible within exiting blockchain architectures, or if it is feasible as a parallel assurance 
mechanism, such that commitments are uploaded to an existing blockchain. This 





II. CURRENT RESEARCH ON LEDGER MERGENCE 
Blockchain technology has been often touted as solution to various challenges 
since its inception under Bitcoin and cybercurrency. However, blockchain technology 
may benefit Navy logistics. In essence, blockchains are a list of records, 
or blocks, cryptographically linked as a distributed ledger for recording 
transactions among parties in a permanent and verifiable way (Zheng et al., 2017). 
Blockchain could also support “smart contracts” which may be away to reduce 
administrative friction.  
The hallmarks of a robust Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) are 
decentralization between blockchain networks and the individual nodes in those 
networks, as well as the consensus reached when validating individual blocks when 
added to a network’s blockchain ledger (Khan, 2019). Khan (2019) also notes that 
characteristics such as the number of transactions per second (TPS) that a network can 
process, the network’s scalability, and how a particular network guards against malicious 
attempts to add false information, are also key to a good system. 
This work focuses on authentication of changes at the micro-level, with 
transparency in a ledger for support of supply chain assurance. Industry is working on a 
number of efforts involving supply chain logistics and supply chain management such as 
Hyperledger (2020), Everledger (2020), and Ethereum (2020) that may have an 
application to the Navy’s logistical systems and perhaps could contribute to an agile 
logistical system. The central challenge is applying such efforts beyond acquisitions to 
the whole lifecycle of the supply chain. 
 
A. A QUICK LOOK AT DLT THEN AND NOW 
Nakamoto (2009) is considered the conventional originator of the original 
description of blockchain technology, although it is focused on the financial and Bitcoin 
applications. One should note, however, that the concepts surrounding blockchain predate 
this by a decade or so, and there is other research available on distributed ledgers 
previous to that timeframe. Beyond Bitcoin, DLT and blockchain have been researched 
for various financial and operational tracking purposes. Zheng et al. (2017) and Natarajan 
 3 
et al. (2017) provide a general and fairly informal introduction into DLT and how it 
might integrate into mainstream day to day operations in the financial, private, and 
government sectors.  Natarajan et al. (2017) also provides a sense of how “decentralized 
records of flow of commodities and materials across a supply chain by using trusted 
stakeholders to validate flows and movements” could benefit those stakeholders, leading 
credence to adopting DLT which would enhance trust in the supply chain.  For an 
overview of blockchain research, consult Fosso et al., (2020), which highlights the 
benefits of the creation of value in operations and supply chain management (OSCM). 
Statistics such as the number of published papers by country, topic, keyword summary 
and relationships are recorded.  
Although not explicitly addressing blockchain technology, Bonanni (2011) 
discusses supply chain discovery/awareness, concepts and concerns that motivate the 
current work. Bonanni argues for “Radical Transparency” in the context of sustainable 
(carbon cost) supply chains, carbon-footprint measured supply chains and product life 
cycle awareness and optimization. This runs into a similar problem set that DoD 
acquisition may encounter – companies’ unwillingness to reveal their supply chain details 
as trade secrets, or an inability to do so, being unaware of the source of their sources. 
There has also been a line of research covering direct application of blockchain to 
supply chain management. Korpela et al. (2018) provides an analysis of how blockchain 
could be used to solve or ameliorate the issues of concern of the major stakeholders 
involved in a very large supply chain operation. The main contribution of the paper is 
proposed elimination of a third party to mediate/handle supply chain inter-business and 
then address these popular concerns as graphed in the following Table 1. Meanwhile, 
Banerjee (2018) provides an overview/summary of the use and benefits of blockchain in 
supply chain operations such as: 
• Reduced counterfeiting and origin tracing 
• Digital product details/lifecycle 
• Custom-built provenance solutions: Software service providers can use the 
blockchain framework to build provenance solutions for its customers 
(permission blockchain) 
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Based on Banerjee’s work, custom-built solutions appear to have gained traction 
within industry. For instance, Infosys® has developed a product provenance solution 
using Oracle® Blockchain Cloud Services that is based on Hyperledger™ Fabric. 
Infosys® has also developed a coffee bean tracking provenance solution for its 
customers. Such examples point towards a demand for custom built provenance solutions 
that can be developed with product or industry specific validations. It is important to note 
that the concept of provenance only functions when all the supply chain stakeholders are 
part of the blockchain network. The architecture of blockchain inherently traces products 
as they pass from one supply chain entity to another. These transactions are stored as 
blocks and chronologically linked according to the physical movement of “the goods.” 
Supporting such tracking technologies motivates our solution (see Section C). 
Kshetri (2018) provides a theoretical framework related to key objectives of 
Supply Chain Management (SCM). Kshetri’s work covers several corporate case studies 
of how the Internet of Things (IoT) blockchain SCM can be used by companies with 
differing levels and areas of interest in supply chain verification/source confidence (see 
Table 1). Such case studies, including the Chipotle™ E-coli outbreak ingredient tracing 
case study, may shed light on potential parallel solution behaviors involving a 
faulty/compromised hardware component recall in the DoD. Under a similar formal goal, 
Queiroz et al. (2018) covers blockchain SCM adoption in the U.S. and India. The study 
advocates for drawing on emerging literature on blockchain, supply chain and network 
theory, as well as on technology acceptance models (TAMs). Queiroz et al. (2018) 
introduce a model based on a slightly altered version of the classical unified theory of 





Table 1. Cases selected and their classification in terms of incorporation of the IoT 






III. A METHOD FOR ADAPTING DISTRIBUTED LEDGER FOR 
SUPPLY CHAIN USE 
A. UAV USE CASE: SYSTEMS DEPLOYED BY U.S. NAVY SHIPS 
Defining unique supply-chain characteristics of deployed Naval assets 
increasingly depend upon the deployment, maintenance and just-in-time improvement of 
unmanned systems. 
Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) have two classes of relatively small surface 
warships designed for operations near shore by the U.S. Navy (“Littoral combat ship,” 
2020). Modern designs allow for flexible mission execution, various mission payloads, 
and other tasking. Reduced crew complements mean individuals are assigned, yet with 
reduced inventories of spare parts and supplies. 
The use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) help in this regard. These vehicles 
are employed for scouting and other rapid response detailing that minimize risk to the 
overall mission, ship and crew. The ecosystem for a typical UAV consists of four 
categories of components: 
• Hardware: airframe, sensors, computers 
• Software: communication, guidance and control 
• Additive Manufacturing (AM): 3D printed wings, tails and other small 
parts for ad hoc repair 
• Information: keys, training, repair instructions, feedback, safety 
Within these four categories of components, each is different and necessary for 
aggregation into a complete device, and each has different stakeholders and supply chains 
feeding ships supplies. Thus, four parallel supply chains of interest exist, and each is 
interdependent; therefore, any mergence solution should necessarily support all four 
aspects, as seen in Figure 1. Note that even with acquisition of a device as a single unit, 
the nature of updates, potential repairs, and parts reuse between devices imply that it must 





Figure 1. UAV Operational Assembly and Modification 
 
B. SYSTEM CONSTRAINTS AND REQUIREMENTS IDENTIFICATION 
In this section the various system requirements are explored, in the context of the 
UAV use case. 
1. Scenario: UAV Deployment, Repair, Operations 
Suppose that a ship deploys with stock gear and consists of two distinct, yet 
similar versions of a UAV. The ship must maintain its current pace of operations until 
return to port, or resupply. 
Under normal operations, the following issues may affect device history, in that 
they impact the integrity of the device or its trustworthiness, and therefore should be 
added in an authenticated manner to the device history: 
• Software updates  
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• Training and safety updated to ship standard operating procedures (SOP) 
and tactics, training and procedures (TTP) 
Now suppose that a collision occurs during testing between the two UAV causing 
damage to each vehicle. The following may also be important changes to the device 
history, requiring authenticated changes in device records: 
• Hardware replacements on board, to include classified components 
• 3D printing for upgraded tail assemblies 
• Maintenance feedback to shore commands 
Any mergence solution must therefore support, per minimum such a variety of 
changes to the item history. 
2. Mergence Requirements Assessment – Verifiability 
In addition to the afore mentioned types of item record changes, there are also 
requirements in how a change is recorded. In particular, the record must be verifiable. In 
terms of verifiability, the following requirements are also essential and must be supported 
by a mergence solution: 
• Conformation that a given component X is on the ship 
• Conformation of all devices in the inventory that have X as a component 
• Conformation if and when X has been replace/repaired/etc., within a 
particular device 
• Conformation of the change entity – the responsible party to 
change/split/remove/combine X as a component within devices 
• Ability to add logs or metadata  
The above requirements emerge from use case issues. For example, if a device 
component is found to be compromised and must be removed, the logged data associated 
with the device should indicate if it has been removed and by whom. Furthermore, is it 
important for administration purposes to identify all possible devices containing the 
compromised component for swift handling and damage mitigation. In these contexts, 
“components” may refer not only to hardware, but also malicious software or poorly 
executed additive manufacturing (e.g., 3D printed wings with vulnerable integrity). 
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3. Mergence Requirements Assessment – Flexibility 
Finally, flexibility requirements associated with mergence are listed. Since 
mergence solutions must support potential external (industry/non-DoD) supply chain 
tracking of unpredictable natures, the mergence solution must be fairly adaptable. 
Furthermore, external supply chain tracking may differ from internal (DoD) tracking, and 
the potential solution must support one or more blockchains used internally to the DoD. 
As many acquisition devices may be of a sensitive nature, the mergence solution must 
furthermore support various classification levels, such that unclassified devices may be 
administered in unclassified environments, while devices of higher classification levels 
can also be managed within the same mergence solution without sensitive information 
leakage. Finally, in addition to all of these, devices transfer hands between organizations 
ships, etc., requiring a flexibility to record management. This leads us to the following 
final four solution requirements: 
• Flexibility independent of source/industry in the external supply chain 
• Flexibility with internal blockchains(s) within DoD 
• Flexibility with classification levels 
• Flexibility for device transfer between organizations/ships/etc. internally 
 
 
C. LEDGER MERGENCE EITHER IN BLOCKCHAIN OR AS A MODULAR 
APPROACH LEVERAGING EXISTING BLOCKCHAIN SOLUTIONS 
There is a natural separation between external-DoD and internal-DoD supply 
chain tracking. This intrinsically leads to a dual solution, with the acquisition boundary 
denoting a change in authenticity tracking. Even for internal supply chain tracking, 
satisfying all solution requirements appears, on the outset, to be impossible. Notably a 
solution that crosses classification boundaries must be carefully handled, especially for 
full item records and tracking information. This is handled by further separating out the 
internal DoD authentication chain into two parts. 
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1. External and Internal Chains 
DoD equipment is typically procured via outside commercial manufacturing 
vendors. The supply chain starts outside of the DoD where parts and other equipment 
must be verified and validated before becoming available inside internal supply chains. 
Conceptually, manufacturers many require supply chain assurance as well, tracking 
purchased components for integration in building devices. This may take the form of 
various blockchains (see Figure 2 “Supply chain”). Minimally, manufacturers may be 
required to present verification on the types and sources of a device’s components. At 
acquisition, a new item record will be formed, such that the component history of the 
acquired device is verified and authenticated by the acquisition authority, who registers 
components under a digitally signed genesis block. Once a genesis block for the internal 
ledger is formed, tracking may proceed internally.  
What is essential at the DoD boundary/component registration step is that actual 
verification of internal components to a device. Information on processing chips, 
software, extra must be recorded. This enables future tracking such that if, for instance, a 
component is later discovered to be compromised in the manufacturing chain, all devices 
containing the critical component can be identified. The genesis block thus serves as an 
initial registration for all components, such that it is only necessary to record changes to 
that initial list within the device history record.   
 
Figure 2. DoD Acquisition: Verification of External Input Chains(s), Registering of 
Devices to Initiate Internal Chains 
 
2. Mergence Operations 
Internal tracking is broken into two further chains to support classification 
boundaries. The device chain handles immediate time history, and authenticates records 
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as visible to the admin. Moreover, the device chain is designed to support the current 
Depot Level Repairable (DLR) system. Within the mergence solution, in addition to the 
device chain, one or more internal blockchains are also supported. These may be 
organization level blockchains, or classification level blockchains. Here, the term 
blockchain is employed for a distributed immutable ledger, without specification that 
restricts to any particular ledger format or consensus method. This in turn meets the 
flexibility requirements specified in Section B.  
The following device chain operations are fixed, in accordance with the 
requirements: 
• Device registration: adding new, original item to a ledger. This creates the 
genesis block for the device chain. 
• Device repair: adding a new component onto an existing device. This 
differs from device combine in that the component being added has no 
registration history (i.e., no genesis block). This may occur if the repair 
takes place using additive manufacturing. 
• Device split: separation of components within an existing device. This 
supports potential re-use or disposal, such as when a component breaks 
and is removed from the current item record (device history is still 
maintained). This creates two separate device chains: one for each split 
component.  
• Device combine: integrate two components into a new combined device. 
This supports customization of devices after acquisition and parts 
replacement (e.g., a newly purchased component added to an existing 
device). 
 
Device split can be employed if a device breaks, but components can be reused. 
For example, suppose that a UAV (UAV1) malfunctions but certain components can be 
used to repair another UAV (UAV2). The broken device would then have a device split 
operation in its item record, creating two new chains: one for component that will be 
reused and one for the remaining unusable assembly UAV1. A device combine operation 
then integrates the split component into UAV2. As such, the item history of UAV1 is 
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now linked to UAV2. If there were relevant repairs to the reused component or if it 
comes to light that the reused component was compromised during manufacture and must 
be pulled from use, it will be immediately clear from UAV2’s record history that the part 
now resides within UAV2 instead of the UAV1 device carcass. 
Each of the stated operations must be authenticated. For this be use the PKI 
infrastructure already inherent in the DLR system. The operator responsible for the 
device signs the various operations. The signature covers the current record for the 
device(s) being operated on as well as what type of operation is performed. The 
authenticated transcript is stored as part of the device chain. These operations are shown 
in Figure 3. 
The distributed ledger and shared memory exist beyond the immediate device 
chain history, such that an item record cannot be changed a posteriori. For this, a 
blockchain is employed, which records the signatures from the device chain operations. 
Note that only signatures are required, and not the related device information, to be stored 
on the blockchain, although the latter may be. Storage of further information or metadata 
may be beneficial for device tracking but could also leak information (such as if the 
device or its location is sensitive). Instead, only the minimum information on the 
blockchain concerning the current signature state is required.   
 
Figure 3. Sequencing Operations for Blockchains 
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3. Multilevel Security (MLS) Classification Agility Considerations 
For hybrid devices used in the fleet, activities may occur and be needed across 
multiple levels and domains of security, such as: UNCLASS, CONFIDENTIAL, 
SECRET, and TOP SECRET. A solution is to map to a Multilevel Security (MLS) 
classification system and demonstrate interoperability. 
Note that while the device chain contains potentially classified information, the 
information sent to the blockchain is comprised of merely the signature on the data vs. 
the data itself; any further additions are optional. Even with a time code associated to the 
signature object representation there is no intrinsic value to the information outside of the 
context of the signed data, especially with a plentitude of blockchain transactions. Thus, 
the blockchain information can be shared across multi-level security systems since these 
codes are useless without ledger/database access. 
In addition to the above observation, blockchains may be allowed to operate at 
different classification levels, such that more relevant device information may in fact be 
added to the blockchain than merely the signature. This in turn implies that any device 
may have a record with varying classification levels attached to different aspects of the 
associated information, and that the associated data may be placed on the relevant 
blockchain. Naturally, higher classification can correlate same and lower-level data 
records, but not write to them, per the properties of the MLS system. Figure 4 illustrates 
this framework in practice. 
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To consider how this may work in practice, the reader can walk through the 
following conceptualized steps for handling the mergence solution of device chains and 
blockchains within MLS: 
1) A new item genesis record for an UNCLASS device is created for the 
device chain. This correlates to a device origin record with signature 
information populated to the various blockchains. 
2) The device is transferred from an UNCLASS environment to a SECRET 
environment. The device chain is now maintained at SECRET. 
3) The device is repaired, using a combine operation on the device chain. 
Necessary information is populated to the appropriate and corresponding 
SECRET level blockchain, while other chains record signature 
information only. 
If it is later discovered that the device contained a malfunctioning or 
compromised component (e.g., through manufacturer notification), then an operator can 
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see all associated components in the device genesis block, recognizing that the critical 
component is present. It can then be seen that the device as associated to a different 
classification (or organization blockchain) and the appropriate authority for that 
blockchain can be contacted, who can then trace the device’s history to identify if the 
component is still present or has been replaced. 
 Strengthening Naval supply-chain accountability, integrity and trust that is 
distributed across exceptionally ling, intermittent and diverse communication networks is 
an example of Data-Centric Security, which is an important topic being explored as part 
of the Network Optional Warfare (NOW) project (Network Optional Warfare, 2020). 
 
D. DOD EQUIPMENT REPAIR TRANSACTIONS USING THE 
HYPERLEDGER™ FABRIC FRAMEWORK FOR DISTRIBUTED 
BLOCKCHAIN LEDGER KEEPING 
It is important to show that such theoretical functionality is indeed achievable in 
practice. This project demonstrates and end-to-end exemplar scenario using the industry-
grade software, the open-sourced Hyperledger™ Fabric (HLR) Framework (Hyperledger, 
2020) hosted on GitHub (2020). This exemplar has been constructed to showcase what 
various repair level organizations might use to record supply chain transactions between 
them using DLT to merge separate blockchains into one. 
1. UAV Camera 
Present in the exemplar scenario are an organizational level (O-level) end user of 
an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in its custody that houses a camera subcomponent, a 
depot level repairable (DLR) that requires repair at the depot level (D-level), and the D-
level repair station. The client application transactions that take place and recorded on the 
blockchain ledger are: 
1) O-level issues the non-functional DLR camera to D-level for repair 
2) D-level accepts and conducts the required repairs for the DLR camera 
3) D-level reissues the repaired DLR camera back to O-level 
 
The intent is to show chain of custody for the DLR camera subcomponent, camera 
metadata, i.e., serial number, and status of repair of the DLR in the supply chain and how 
each O-level and D-level ledger merge to comprise the DLR repair history. 
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The blockchain network, N, will comprise of the following consortium 
organizations, components and entities (see Figure 5): 
• Organizations R1 (D-level), R2 (O-level) & R4 (blockchain network 
administrator). 
• Client applications A1 (D-level transactor) & A2 (O-level transactor). 
Client applications conduct transactions on behalf of their respective 
organizations. 
• Certificate authorities CA1, CA2 & CA4. Each organization can prefer 
their own vetted certificate authority. 
• Peers P1 (D-level) & P2 (O-level). Peers maintain local copies of and 
record blockchain ledger transactions in accordance with agreed upon 
smart contracts (chaincode) within the consortium. 
• Blockchain ledger L1. Each peer maintains and communicates with other 
network peers to ensure local blockchain ledger copies are kept uniform 
throughout the network. 
• Smart contract (chaincode) S5. Peers are able to maintain blockchain 
ledger uniformity through consortium member agreed upon smart 
contracts. 
• Network ordering service O4. The ordering service serves as the initial 
administrative gateway between consortium members upon network 
standup. 
• Network configuration NC4. Consortium members R1, R2 and R4 all 
agree upon the blockchain network configuration policies administered by 
ordering service O4 via NC4. 
• Channel configuration CC1. The channel configuration allows for network 
peers to accept and distribute blockchain ledger transactions between 
authorized organizations in accordance with NC4. 
• Channel 1. The communications channel where organizational peers 





Figure 5. DoD Equipment Repair Blockchain Network (N) Configuration Topology 
 
 
2. Using the Fabric Test Network 
Hyperledger (2020) provides a test network that developers can download and 
work their way through a demonstration of the capabilities of Hyperledger™ Fabric. The 
portal for that demonstration is here: https://hyperledger-
fabric.readthedocs.io/en/latest/test_network.html. Depending on the operating system of 
the developer’s choice, a specific environment is first set up on a local machine in order 
to leverage the Hyperledger™ Fabric framework. Once the prerequisites are complete, 
the test network is invoked via command line scripts and the demonstration can proceed. 
In our case the demonstration code was modified locally to mimic our UAV camera 
scenario. 
3. DLR Transactions in Action 







Upon network standup/startup, the various organizational peers, admins, etc. are 
defined, registered, enrolled and assigned certificate authorities which then issue 
authenticating certificates for each respective network node. The agreed upon smart 
contract (chaincode) is deployed to each organizational peer node and tested. Finally, 
each organizational peer node is given local custody of the blockchain ledger which is 
then readied for acceptance of and recording of ledger transactions (see Figures 6-9). 
 



















Figure 9. Schema Checking and Transaction Testing of Deployed Chaincode 
Between Organizational Peers 
 
 
The network (N) is now ready to facilitate transactions. Each client application 
(authorized organizational transaction entity) then submits their authentication data to 
network (N) before the network authorizes transactions to take place.  
 
 
Figure 10. Authentication of Client Application Entities (Pre-transactional) 
 
 
Finally, the network (N) is operational, and authorized organizational entities are 
recognized. Transactions may begin now, but only those which are explicity defined in 
the smart contract. Figure 11 beings with an O-level entity submitting a UAV camera to 
D-level for repair. 
 21 
 




Figure 12. D-level UAV Camera Repair Transaction 
 
 





Figures 11-13 show the three transactions completed, as per the smart contract 
constructs initiated from each of the O-level and D-level authorized entities. These 
transactions were initiated from each client gateway interface application that has 
knowledge of the network (N) from their respective remote locations. The next two 





Figure 14. D-level Peer Showing Chaincode Testing and All Client Application 











Figure 16. Successful Shutdown of Blockchain Network (N) 
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4. Basic Network Timing Data 
The table below annotates various local network timing data points using a 2015 
Apple® MacBook Pro® laptop with a 3.1 GHz Dual-Core Intel i7 and 16 GB of RAM 
running the latest macOS® operating system. 
 
Network Action Time Units 
Blockchain Network Startup/Standup 2 min 19 sec 
Client Application Authentication 19.4 sec 
 O-level DLR Issue Transaction 18.3 sec 
D-level Acceptance/Receipt ACK of DLR 17.8 sec 
D-level Reissue of RFI DLR 18 sec 
 
Table 2. Network Timing of Various DLR Transactions on Network (N) 
 
 
The codebase for this presentation is located on the on the Naval Postgraduate 
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